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POLICE SEARCHES OF INNOCENT THIRD PARTIES:
A CONGRESSIONAL RESPONSE TO
ZURCHER v. STANFORD DAILY
Birch Bayh *
On Monday, April 12, 1971, four police officers of Santa Clara County,
California executed a search warrant against the offices of the Stanford
Daily, a student newspaper published'at Stanford University.' In a very short
time, that somewhat ordinary action would become the source of a raging
constitutional battle.
The police were ordered to search for and seize any photographs or negatives
of a demonstration which had occurred several days before at the Stanford
University Hospital. The demonstration, covered by Stanford Daily reporters,
had resulted in violence and several police officers had been attacked and
injured by demonstrators. Subsequent articles and photographs in the newspaper
convinced the local prosecutor's office that the Daily may have had additional
photographs in its possession which could assist in identifying and prosecuting
those who had assaulted the police officers. The Santa Clara County District
Attorney's Office secured a warrant to search the newspaper offices. There
was never any indication that the newspaper was involved with the criminal
activity.
Late on Monday, April 12, 1971, Palo Alto police officers raided the Stanford
Daily offices. The newspaper's filing cabinets, waste paper baskets, desks, and
photographic laboratories were thoroughly examined. Although the police had
an opportunity to read a number of notes and confidential memoranda during
their search, they denied overstepping the bounds of their warrant. No additional
evidence was found and the officers subsequently left.
Several Stanford Daily staff members subsequently filed suit under Title
42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging violations of their civil rights. Both the United
States District Court 2 and the Court of Appeals 3 agreed with the plaintiffs
that the fourth and fourteenth amendments to the Constitution barred issuing
warrants to search nonsuspect third parties when no probable cause was shown
that a subpoena duces tecum would be impractical.4 The United States
Supreme Court, however, reversed the lower courts in a 5 to 3 decision, with
Justice Brennan not participating.
Justice White, speaking for the majority, reasoned that neither the wording
nor the history of the fourth amendment required a standard for searches of
nonsuspects different from that of suspects. The majority held that all that
the Constitution requires is a finding of probable cause that the items to be
seized are in a particular location. If the search involves first amendment
*U.S. Senator from Indiana
1. Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547 (1978).
2. Stanford Daily v. Zurcher, 353 F. Supp. 124 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
3. Stanford Daily v. Zurcher, 550 F.2d 464 (9th Cir. 1977).
4. 353 F. Supp. at 132.
Journal of Legislation
interests, the only further protection afforded is a properly issued warrant
applied with particular exactitude. Insistence upon a subpoena, Justice White
explained, would cause unnecessary delay and result in losing valuable evidence.
Responses to the Zurcher opinion by the news industry have been vehement.
A move for congressional reform in response to the ruling has drawn support
from both liberal and conservative groups.5 Since the decision applied to searches
of the files of clergy, doctors, businessmen, lawyers, and many others, the
reform movement has gathered increased support. Shortly after the decision,
I introduced S. 3164, the Citizen's Privacy Protection Amendment of 1978,
designed "to assure the rights of citizens under the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments of the Constitution and to protect the freedom of the press under
the First Amendment. ' 6
Subsequent to the introduction of this bill, the Subcommittee on the
Constitution, which I chair, held four days of hearings on the problems
associated with the Zurcher decision and possible legislative responses to it.
Throughout these hearings we have sought a broad range of opinions and have
received testimony from the Department of Justice, the National District
Attorneys Association, a variety of press organizations, the American Civil
Liberties Union, and a panel of constitutional experts. In this comment, I will
examine the policy considerations and constitutional questions which we have
explored in our hearings concerning the Zurcher v. Stanford Daily decision.
A FREE AND INDEPENDENT PRESS?
Prior to Zurcher, the Supreme Court had never specifically dealt with the
first and fourth amendment questions as posed in that case. Any discussion
of fourth amendment protections of innocent third parties had largely been
confined to problems of standing which those parties faced when challenging
the legality of a search. 7 Since 1971, however, unannounced searches of the
media have been increasing. 8 One search, conducted by police of the radio
station, KPFK-FM in Los Angeles, lasted over eight hours and extended to
all parts of the station. 9
Prior to Zurcher, the Supreme Court in Camara v. Municipal Court, lOreject-
ed the notion that an individual had fully protected fourth amendment rights
only when suspected of a crime. In fact Justice White in Camara ironically
said:
It is surely anomalous to say that the individual and his private property are
fully protected by the Fourth Amendment only when the individual is suspected
of criminal behavior. For instance, even the most law-abiding citizen has a
5. The Boston Globe called the decision "a first step toward a police state." 124 Cong. Rec. H5654
(daily ed. June 15, 1978). Howard K. Smith of ABC News, on June 2, 1978, called the decision
"the worst, most dangerous ruling the Court has made in memory." On June 8, 1978, James L.
Kilpatrick of the Washington Star condemned the opinion for its ignorance of the newgathering process.
6. S. 3164, § 2, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 124 Cong. Rec. S8557 (daily ed. June 5, 1978).
7. See, e.g.. Brown v. United States, 411 U.S. 223 (1973); Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165
(1973); Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960).
8. See. The Press Censorship Newsletter ("PCN"), published by The Reporter's Committee for Freedom
of the Press, Legal Defense and Research Fund, Washington, D.C., which has documented fifteen
subsequent searches similar to the one in Zurcher. See especially, 4 PCN, at 25 (1974); 6 PCN, at
30 (1975).
9. 6 PCN, at 30 (1975).
10. 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
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very tangible interest in limiting the circumstances under which the sanctity
of his home may be broken by official authority, for the possibility of criminal
entry under the guise of official sanction is a serious threat topersonal family
and security.'1
But Justice White apparently had a change of heart in Zurcher and
chose to ignore the serious threat to personal family and security as well as
the first amendment erosions Zurcher signaled.
Nonsuspect third parties, at a minimum, should be entitled to the same
constitutional status in regard to unreasonable searches as criminal sus-
pects. 12 When that third party is a newspaper, first and fourth amendment
values converge. The fourth amendment commands that any search which is
unreasonable violates constitutional protections. 13 The first amendment prohibits
any restrictions on the exercise of free speech. Given these considerations and
the several Supreme Court opinions requiring a more restrictive standard for
issuing search warrants when first amendment considerations arise, 15 the
precedential analysis of Zurcher, not to mention the policy considerations, are
at best dubious.
The media's ability to gather, edit, and disseminate the news has been
recognized by our courts. 16 As Justice Stewart pointed out in his dissent in
Zurcher, all three of these purposes will be impaired when a warrant is
preferred to the less intrusive subpoena duces tecum. Zurcher also threatens
to dry up the confidential sources that play an important role in assisting the
media, who in turn, must inform the public. No file, desk drawer, or attic is
insulated from a surprise police search under Zurcher.
Granted, the fourth amendment does not bar search warrants "simply
because the owner or possessor of the place to be searched is not then
reasonably suspected of criminal involvement." 17 But when the media is the
party to be searched, special considerations should attach. A less intrusive
method of gathering the same evidence is available to the prosecutor in the
subpoena. 18 But the Zurcher decision ignores considering such an alternative.
I should emphasize that I would not deny the police every legitimate means
of prosecuting suspected wrongdoers. Yet Zurcher has left the printing and
broadcasting industry with an imminent potential for unfettered governmental
disruption of the newsgathering process. In the wake of a rash of Zurcher-type
searches, it would only be a matter of time until a free and vigorous press
found their constitutionally protected functions hampered by these limitations
on newsgathering.
11. Id. at 530-31.
12. See, e.g., Ohio ex rel. Eaton v. Price, 364 U.S. 263, 269 (1960).
13. U.S. Const. amend. IV provides, "The right of the people to be secure in their person, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or Affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized."
14. U.S. Const. amend. I provides, "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the
right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances."
15. See, e.g., United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297 (1972); Roaden v. Kentucky,
413 U.S. 496 (1973); Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476 (1965).
16. See Bursey v. United States, 466 F.2d 1059, 1084-85, reh. en banc denied, 466 F.2d 1090 (9th Cir.
1972) which discusses the use of a press subpoena in relation to these interests.
17. 436 U.S. at 571, n.l (Stewart, J., dissenting opinion).
18. 353 F. Supp. at 132.
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Presently, searches are tempered by the sole prerequisite that police first
obtain a search warrant. Justice White emphasized that a neutral magistrate
would review such requests. 19 Such putative protections offer newsmen and
newswomen little consolation when studies demonstrate that less than .3%
of wiretap warrant applications since 1969 have been refused. 20 Moreover, the
very basis of Zurcher is the permissibility of unannounced surprise searches
of newsrooms. Confidential information which has no bearing on the investigation
being conducted could very obviously be exposed during a police search.
Confidential news sources will become a journalistic relic.
Imagine the scenario following a search of the offices of the New York
Times in 1971. The Pentagon Papers would never have been published. If the
Washington Post had its files searched after Woodward and Bernstein had
made their initial findings public, the Watergate story might never have been
released. There can be little doubt that Zurcher intimidates confidential
sources. If confidential sources are reluctant to expose corruption, the government
itself will suffer.
The Zurcher holding also puts pressure on the news media to adopt
procedures for self-censorship. Gene Roberts, the National News Editor for
the New York Times has noted that:
All reporters have taken written notes of factual disclosures received in
confidence. If such notes are subject to police seizure, it is likely that reporters
will stop bringing them back to their offices and using them as aids in
preparing their stories. I am obviously concerned for the quality and character
of journalism if reporters refrain from taking notes or taping interviews for
fear that this raw stuff might easily be available to government officials
through the device of the search warrant. 21
Some newspeople may hold on to articles until law enforcement agencies
have gathered the same information independently. Some articles may simply
go unpublished to avoid likely searches by police. Zurcher says that such a
chilling effect on the media's exercise of first amendment rights, in itself, is
not sufficiently dispositive to declare a search an unreasonable state
action. 22 Given these policy considerations, and given the "less drastic
means" 23 analysis, which requires the least intrusive state action when
reasonableness is at issue, a subpoena-first rule is preferred. Judge Peckham
in his District Court opinion in Zurcher applied that very analysis. 24 The
Citizen's Privacy Protection Act,25 S. 3164, seeks to codify that preference for
a subpoena duces tecum.
A final danger Zurcher poses is that the public may cease to perceive the
press as independent. A newpaper may become an unwilling ally to the
prosecution in a criminal investigation. There would no longer be a separation
19. 436 U.S. at 566.
20. Of 5,563 applications for wiretap warrants from 1969 to 1976 under the Omnibus Crime Control and
Safe Streets Act of 1968, magistrates denied only 15. In 1977, none of the 526 applications were
refused. Reports of the Administrative Office of the United States Court, (1978).
21. Brief for Respondents at 24, Zurcher v Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547 (1978) (Affidavit of Gene
Roberts).
22. Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. at 566 citing Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
23. See Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488, 493 (1966). See also, Note, Less Drastic Means and the
First Amendment, 78 Yale L.J. 464 (1969).
24. 353 F. Supp. at 135.
25.. S. 3164, § 2, supra note 6.
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of press and government. These fearful consequences foreshadowed by
Zurcher have led twenty-six states to have codified "shield laws" designed to
protect reporters. 26 S. 3164 would provide the federal counterpart necessary to
augment additional protections.
"THE RIGHT OF THE PEOPLE TO BE SECURE
AGAINST UNREASONABLE SEARCHES . . .
SHALL NOT BE VIOLATED .
Zurcher also poses equally poignant problems for non-media third parties.
At present, every home and office is open to surprise searches by government
authorities seeking evidence of someone else's crime. A serious potential exists
for the government to abuse our right to privacy-the most fundamental and
comprehensive of all constitutional rights. 27 As Justice Stevens' dissent points
out, just as the witnesses who participate in an investigation of a trial far
outnumber the defendants, so the innocent persons who may possess some type
of evidence of a crime far outnumber those who are actually involved in the
crime.28 Every innocent person is now subject to a surprise search of his or
her home. I do not believe that the proper enforcement of our criminal laws
requires that innocent Americans surrender their right to privacy to unannounced
governmental searches of their homes or businesses.
The right to privacy is the foundation of our civil liberties. Privacy is the
one concept, more than any other, which separates our society from those
authoritarian systems which do not recognize the rights of the individual. A
person's privacy rights are thus controlling factors when discussing fourth
amendment questions. 29 Although the Supreme Court in Zurcher allegedly
followed Warden v Hayden30, there are those who assert that Zurcher goes
far beyond Warden and revives the atmosphere surrounding the oppressive
general warrants the fourth amendment was designed to prevent. In the words
of William Pitt,
The poorest man in his cottage may bid defiance to all the forces of the
crown. It may be frail, its roof may shake, the wind may blow through it,
the storm may enter, the rain may enter, but the King of England cannot
enter.
If the fourth amendment is to have any meaning at all, these privacy rights
of innocent Americans must be vindicated.
Every professional person is also vulnerable to a surprise search by the
police. An attorney's files may contain information essential to a police
investigation. 31 A search authorized by Zurcher could destroy that attorney's
confidential relationship with his client. Similarly, a patient's confidence in his
psychiatrist, essential to that person's recovery, could be impaired. The spectre
of similar scenarios for any profession lurks ominiously in the aftermath of
the Zurcher decision.
26. Note, The Newsman's Privilege After Branzburg: The Case for a Federal Shield Law, 24 U.C.L.A.
L. Rev. 160, 167, n.41 (1976).
27. See generally, Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965).
28. 436 U.S. at 579 (Stevens, J., dissenting opinion).
29. See Camera v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967); See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541
(1967).
30. 387 U.S. 294 (1966).
31. See Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976); Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322 (1973).
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The implications for our privacy rights are even more serious when one
considers that warrants are issued at ex parte proceedings. Simply put, search
warrants are executed before an innocent third party can contest their validity.
Impeachment of the affidavits upon which a warrant is based is barred in
most states and some federal courts. 32 Such a bar increases the chance for
error. But the most frightening problem lies ahead for the wrongfully-searched
citizen-he .has no possible redress for his privacy infringement. Since a
nonsuspect is not a defendant in the criminal proceeding, the exclusionary
rule 33 is unavailable to suppress illegally obtained evidence. He simply has no
standing in a majority of cases to object to the use of illegally obtained
evidence in the trial of another person. 34 Police are thus not deterred from
unlawful searches because the incentives inherent in the exclusionary rule are
absent.
Damage actions are also a relatively fruitless effort since a good faith
defense must first be overcome. As Judge Peckham noted in his lower court
decision: "If law enforcement agencies were not required to first explore the
subpoena alternative in third party situations, . . . there would be the rather
incongruous result that one suspected of a crime would receive greater protection
against unlawful searches than a third party."'35 Without damage actions or
an exclusionary rule, innocent Americans are in the very position Judge
Peckham feared most.
CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORIZATION FOR CONGRESSIONAL RESPONSE
Congressional legislation overturning Zurcher raises a major constitutional
question: may Congress overturn a Supreme Court decision and expand
constitutional protection by imposing legislative restraints on state and local
police? The easy answer is that Congress has reversed Supreme Court decisions
in the past. 36 Congress may do so in the future subject to certain restrictions.
The major constraint involves the constitutional source of laws which limit the
power of the states in an attempt to expand individual liberties. Since the
Citizen's Privacy Protection Act limits searches by "anyone acting under color
of law", 37 state-rights objections could be made. But such objections are valid
only when there are no constitutional provisions providing a basis for the
law. 38 S. 3164, the Citizen's Privacy Protection Act, has such a constitutional
basis.
The primary constitutional provision empowering Congress to enact S. 3164
is section 5 of the fourteenth amendment. 39 That section grants Congress the
power to enforce the fourteenth amendment's due process protections through
32. See United States v. Ventresa, 380 U.S. 102, 108 (1965).
33. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
34. Brown v. United States, 411 U.S. 223 (1973); Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969); Jones
v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960).
35. 353 F. Supp. at 131 (em phasis in original).
36. The Voting Rights Act of1965, § 10, 42 U.S.C. § 1973(h) (1965) (poll tax as prerequisite to voting
violates the constitutional rights of citizens to vote), overruled Breedlove v. Suttles, 302 U.S. 277
(1937); Butler v. Thompson, 341 U.S. 937 (1951).
37. S. 3164, § 2, supra note 6.
38. Cohen, Congressional Power to Interpret Due Process and Equal Protection, 27 Stan. L. Rev. 603
(1974-75).
39. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 5.
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any necessary legislation. In Katzenbach v. Morgan,40 the Supreme Court
clarified the scope of this "Enabling Clause." Katzenbach signaled the
Supreme Court's affirmation of the constitutionality of § 4(e) of the Voting
Rights Act of 1965. 41 The Supreme Court upheld this legislation as a proper
exercise of Congress' right to enact whatever legislation it deemed necessary
to secure the fourteenth amendment's guarantees. 42 As long as the legislation
bears a rationale relationship to the purposes of the fourteenth amendment,
that legislation is appropriate. 43 S. 3164 marks an exercise of Congressional
power similar to that in the Voting Rights Act since section 5 is also the
constitutional grounding for S. 3164. In fact, section 2 of the bill expressly
states that its purpose is "to assure the rights of citizens under the Fourth
and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution and to protect the freedom
of the press under the First Amendment."' 44
THE CITIZEN'S PRIVACY PROTECTION AMENDMENT
That Congress carries the burden to respond to Zurcher is further
evidenced by Justice White's closing invitation to Congress that: "Of course,
the Fourth Amendment does not prevent or advise against legislative or executive
efforts to establish nonconstitutional protections against possible abuses of the
search warrant procedure . . . -45 Philip B. Heymann, speaking for the Attorney
General of the United States, appeared before my Subcommittee on the
Constitution and emphasized that the Justice Department recognizes the
government's duty to reassure the press and public of their concern for
protecting first and fourth amendment rights.46 The Citizen's Privacy Protection
Amendment seeks to fulfill that need.
S. 3164, unlike some of the bills introduced by my colleagues last
term,47 is not restricted to protecting only the press from future Zurcher searches.
Any innocent person not suspected of a crime but allegedly possessing
incriminating evidence would be protected from unannounced searches. A
subpoena duces tecum would be used in all but a few circumstances.
Subpoenas are preferred for several reasons. Not only would they satisfy
the least drastic method of obtaining the desired evidence, but they would
also tend to pose the smallest disruption to newsgathering and our privacy. If
for some reason the subpoena is defective, a challenge can be made before
confidential information is disclosed. Using a subpoena also avoids the dangers
attendant to police searches of large numbers of unrelated documents in an
unannounced search. Those who have legally-recognized privileges of confidentiality
can, through a subpoena process, object to searches of privileged materials.
40. 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
41. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(6)(e) (1970).
42. 384 U.S. at 651.
43. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
44. S. 3164, § 2, supra note 6.
45. 436 U.S. at 567.
46. Hearings on S. 3164 Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (June 22, 1978) (statement of Philip B. Heymann).
47. Among those restricted are S. 3222, S. 3225, S. 3258, H.R. 12,952, H.R. 13,145, H.R. 13,146, H.R.
13,169, H.R. 13,227, H.R. 13,284, H.R. 13,285, H.R. 13,305, H.R. 13,319, H.R. 13,166, H.R. 13,710,
95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978).
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The Citizen's Privacy Protection Amendment also provides for civil remedies
by the parties wrongfully searched and permits general punitive damages. 48 Two
exceptions to the preference toward subpoenas are also established. One exception
codifies a warrant requirement in cases where the person possessing the evidence
is a suspect. 49 The second exception removes the subpoena requirement when
there are indications that the evidence might be hidden or destroyed.50 These
exceptions, coupled with the general rule favoring subpoenas, strike a favorable
balance between the legitimate needs of law enforcement and the legitimate
rights of privacy of the press and public.
CONCLUSION
The Citizen's Privacy Protection Amendment or some facsimile will be
reintroduced shortly in the 96th Congress. I strongly believe that legislation
is imperative if the first and fourth amendment rights of every American are
to be protected.
The government's ability to search. our homes for evidence of someone
else's crimes must be carefully limited if the first and fourth amendments are
to have any meaning. I believe that Congress has the constitutional authority,
under section 5 of the fourteenth amendment, and the expertise necessary, to
adopt S. 3164 or a similar measure. Congress also has the mandate from the
press and public to act. All that is needed now is for Congress to act.
48. S. 3164, § 2, supra note 6.
49. Id.
50. Id.
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